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CONTRACT-VALIDITY-TRUsT-TETAMENTARY DISPOSITION.
-Sullivan v. Sullivan,56 N.E. (N. Y.) 116. February 6, 1900. On
October 10, 1892, Catharine Sullivan deposited in the Chemung Na-
tional Bank $2,000, and received the following- certificate, in part:
"Catharine Sullivan has depositedin this bank $2,000, payable one day
after date to the order of herself, or in case of her death to her niece
Catharine Sullivan, of Utica, upon return of this certificate." She
retained this certificate, and on her death, which occurred shortly
after, it was found aniong her papers. An action was brought by
her administrator first against the bank, then against the beneficiary.
The defendant Catharine based her claim, first, on the rule which
in some cases gives a third party to a contract the right to enforce
it; second, on the ground that a valid trust was declared in her
favor. It was clearly shown in the trial court, that the depositor
had no intention to create a trust during her life. She informed the
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tc-! !r she %%anted tim .nt fixed tbr herself durin.z her ht, and in
vou-e of h,.r (i ath to htwr nitcc, ( atharine Sullivan of Utica.
Ou hoth princil.- the ('ourt ,,f Appeal- dizeu..-ed it _- own deci-
sii,an.o ... and 41.cide I in avc,ri 11ith the general current of
aithrit. In r.gard lo lhe a.fuiiieit that the defindaut was entitled
t, t he fund a, the le!ieficiryI v a coat ract between the depojsit,,r and
the bank, the .. urt said this case lacked both of the tv.-o elements
which permitted siuch a claim t. he sustained, under the New York
rule. If there had been a n,,ar Wlood relationship, as of husband
and wifl,, or parent and child, between the iromnisee and the belle-
ficiary, or a pre-existing debt the claim would have been good.
In J),tlon v. Poole, 2 Levinz 211, (1677), was first laid down this
departure from the strict principles of contract. There A. made a
pronise to his fither for the benefit of his sister. It was held the
sister could recover. Though this decision was given by a divided
court, and \\as definitely repudiated in Tiwecdle v. Arkinson, 1 B.
& . 3913, (1865), the New York Court hzs extended it to other
cases. Where A. owes B. $1,G00, and C. borrows this money from
A. promising to pay B., the latter can recover. Lawrence v. Fox,
20 N. Y. 268, (1859). This is the leading case in New York, and
under its principle a recovery is allowed if there exists "first an
intent by the promise to secure some benefit to the third party and
secure some privity between the two, the promisee and the party
to be benefited, and some obligation or duty owing from the former
to the latter which would give him a legal or equitable claim to the
benefit of the promise or an equivalent from him personally. A
mere stranger cannot intervene and claim by action the benefit of a
contract between the other parties. There must be either a new
consideration or some prior right or claim against one of the con-
tracting parties by which he has a legal interest in the performance
of the agreement." See Ashley "Cases on Contract."
Even this is a narrow statement of the general doctrine through-
out the western states, and in the federal courts. It has been laid
down in many cases that if there is a clear intention to benefit
directly the third party, he can recover. Nothing is said about
the necessity of a pre-existing debt. It is well to state, however,
that this broad principle is with few exceptions applied to cases
whose facts show the pre-existing debt and therefore come within the
New York doctrine. See note page 280, Huffeuts Anson on Con-
tracts; Nat. Bank v. G-rand Lodge, 98 U. S. 123, (1878); Hendrick
v. Lindsay, 93 U. S. 143, (1876). Some states give a statutory
right of recovery, Stimson Amer. Stat. Law, §. 4117, 4128. Massa-
chusetts follows the rule which is now well settled in England under
Price v. Easton, 4 B. & A. 433, (1833); see Exchange Bank v. Rice,
107 Mass. 37, (1871). Also see as to rule in Michigan, Linneman
v. Moross, 98 Mich. 178, (1893).
The theory of Dutton v. Poole was supported in two late New
York cases, one of which has given rise to harsh criticism, i. e., the
case of Buchanan v. Tilden, 158 N. Y. 109, (1899). In this case
the judge thought the relationship of husband and wife sufficient
ground to maintain the action. He took the strange ground that
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iuch a relation made a good consideration for the prami,,,, :iul that
a husband was at all events bound to maintain his wifb properly.
A. agreed with B. to pay B.'s wife $50,000. I ,. B.'. witho couht
recover, one ground being that B. ought to provide t;)r his wil, thus
giving her an equitable right to sue. See Todd v. ItV'bcr, 95 N. Y.
181, (1884).
In the present case the defendaut'6 father was a nephew ol tile
intestate, and had been given a home by her, anl treated as a son,
but never legally adopted. The intestate had always shown great
affection for the defendant. In the eve of the court such relation-
ship was not equivalent to that shown to exist in the preceding cases,
and the defendant's contract right was denied.
The defendant argued next that the circumstances (if' the deposit
were sufficient to make either the bank or the depositor a trustee,
leaving to the donor a power of revocation. The court answered,
conclusively, this contention by pointing out that the depositor only
intended to establish a debtor and creditor relation. The terms of
the certificate and the evidence in the trial court, proved that no
right in prae.enti was to pass to the defendant. The words of Jessel
in Richards v. Delbridge, L. R. 18 Eq. 11, (1874), are in point:
"The true distinction appears to me to be plain and beyond dispute;
for a man to make himself a trustee there must be a clear expres-
sion of intention to become a trustee, whereas words of present gift
show an intention to give over property to another and not retain it
in the donor's own hands for any purpose, fiduciary or otherwise."
Hence this was no trust; it was no gift because it could not take
effect until after death. Being a testamentary disposition it did not
satisfy the provision of the statute and was, in that sense, also in-
valid. It must be noted that in this case no declaration of trust
was made. If such had been the fact even without notice to the
defendant a good trust would have been created. There is Massa-
chusett's case to the contrary, Clark v. Clark, 108 Mass. 522, (1871).
Here was a deposit accompanied by an express declaration of trust.
The deposit book was retained by the depositor and no notice was
given to the beneficiary. Held, no trust, the decision being based
on Brabrook v. Boston Bank, 104 Mass. 228, (1870). But in this
latter case and in other English and American cases of the same
character, there was no intention to create a trust. The declaration of
trust was made merely to evade bank laws limiting the amount of
deposits to the credit of one person. The state of English law on
this subject is well shown by Field v. Lonsdale, 13 Beav. 78, (1850).
An act of parliament limited deposits. A. deposited in his own
name, and afterward, opened a new account in trust for his sister.
The following argument was used by counsel and adopted by the
court: "When he could no longer, under the act, deposit any further
moneys in his own name, he opened a new account in the name of
his sister, intending it no doubt for his own benefit. A resulting
trust is always presumed in such cases."
The cases represented by Clark v. Clark are few in number, and
lay down an unreasonable rule. The courts regard, fundamentally,
the intention. When the intention to create the trust is clear, it will
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be upheld, whether notice is given to the beneficiary or not. And
once created it is complete and irrevocable.
As stated befbre it was ar.lti by the defeindant that this was a
trust with a power of revocation. itieh a trust was upheld ill Jo6n
es.'e v. M,1tckye, 126 N. Y. 114, (1892). Bonds were given in
trust. The word " trust " was used, also "said bonds fir and during
the lifb of A. to lie subject to his order." 8everal bonds were taken
back by the donor. field, a valid trust in the absence of credit-
or's claims. This power of revocation must be very clearly proved.
It will not l)e implied without strong evidence. In Fellow's App.,
93 Pa. 470, (1880), it was shown that the grantor of lands in trust,
reserved an interest (luring lifb in the proceeds of the property and
gave a benefit in future to others. No power of revocation war
implied but the trust was deemed complete.
